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THE USE AND MISUSE OF DISCLOSURE AS A
REGULATORY SYSTEM
PAULA J. DALLEY *
ABSTRACT
Over the past several decades, legislators and regulators have increasingly turned to disclosure schemes, rather than substantive regulation, to accomplish regulatory goals. Most of these schemes are either expressly or impliedly based on the disclosure-based regulatory
system established by the securities acts, which is primarily intended
to provide information to traders in an established market and
thereby enhance the operation of the market. A secondary purpose of
the securities acts is to alter the behavior of firms and individuals
through the operation of the market. Other disclosure schemes usually
have similar purposes, but they rarely operate in a market akin to the
financial markets. As a result, the mechanism by which the disclosure
scheme is expected to accomplish its purpose is often obscure. Where
there is a specified mechanism for the operation of the disclosure system, it often fails to take account of the way individuals and firms
process and react to information. This Article examines the purposes
and operation of both securities disclosure and other disclosure
schemes and the limitations on the usefulness of disclosure as a regulatory method. The Article then describes criteria for the use and design of disclosure systems as regulatory tools that take into consideration realistic benefits and costs of the disclosure regime.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past several decades, legislators and regulators have
adopted disclosure schemes to accomplish regulatory goals. 1 From
the Truth in Lending Act 2 to the ABA’s Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure, 3 lawmakers have turned to information as a regulatory tool because it is politically acceptable and it interferes less with
individual choice and with the operation of markets. Mandatory disclosure has become a sort of “regulation-lite” extolled even by those
who would ordinarily oppose regulation. 4
Even as disclosure requirements have become increasingly common and their regulatory goals increasingly ambitious, however, research in psychology and economics has cast doubt on the traditional
account of how people process information. Current understanding of
heuristic biases and bounded rationality suggests that information
may affect behavior in unexpected ways and may not, in some circumstances, affect behavior at all. More troubling, we may not be
able to predict how information will affect behavior. Behavioral research also suggests that more information is not necessarily a good
thing. Such behavioral research has led to increased calls for changes
in the way disclosure-based regulations are used and have caused
some to question the very utility of disclosure-based regulation.5
The model for the use of disclosure as a regulatory device is the
system established by the securities acts. That system is not perfect,
but to the extent it is successful, its success is largely because it operates in a singular environment: a highly developed, relatively efficient market with an enormous support structure of both market and
informational intermediaries, in a context in which decision-makers
often seek professional advice and make great efforts to be as ra1. The earliest instance of which the author is aware of a disclosure-like obligation
being used as regulation occurred in 1360, when a rule prohibiting the sale of fish in secret
replaced a rule setting a fixed price. See GWEN SEABOURNE, ROYAL REGULATION OF LOANS
AND SALES IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 88 (2003).
2. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-93 (2000)).
3. MODEL COURT RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/Model_Rule_InsuranceDisclosure.pdf.
4. See Kimberly A. Strassel, The Weekend Interview with Christopher Cox: Full Disclosure, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2006, at A8. Ms. Strassel, a member of the Wall Street Journal’s editorial board, expresses great delight at the apparently novel (to her) idea that securities markets should be regulated by disclosure. See id.
5. See, e.g., Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
139, 148-49 (2006) (discussing the shortcomings of disclosure-based regulation).
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tional as possible. This environment provides a mechanism by which
disclosed information can reach its audience, affect behavior, and
cause a desired result through its operation on a single variable, the
price of a security. It is at least doubtful whether disclosure could accomplish similar goals in different circumstances, and there is no
reason at all to assume that disclosure could accomplish different
goals in different circumstances.
A regulation is supposed to have a goal, and there ought to be a
reason to think that the regulation, through the operation of some
mechanism, will accomplish that goal. 6 Disclosure-based schemes
tend to be based on statements of purpose such as “improving transparency” or “providing information to consumers,” but they often fail
to explain why that additional information will be of value or why its
existence will cause some desired change in behavior. The mechanism by which information affects behavior is complex. The information must be directed at the appropriate decision-maker and the appropriate decision. Furthermore, it must be provided in a form accessible to and usable by the appropriate decision-maker, and the decision-maker must be able respond to the information. Moreover, disclosure can have significant costs beyond the costs of creating and
disseminating the information.
This Article seeks to examine regulatory disclosure systems generally, using the securities laws as a paradigm, in an effort to determine when and how disclosure systems work and to provide guidelines for the use of disclosure by regulators. Part II discusses the
practical and philosophical reasons for the popularity of disclosurebased regulations. Part III contains a discussion of securities disclosure, including its purposes, the mechanism by which it operates,
and its limitations. Part IV provides a similar examination of disclosure systems generally, using a variety of disclosure schemes as
examples. Part V sets out a number of recommendations about
prerequisites that regulators must meet before using disclosure
systems as regulation.

6. See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000) (requiring that rules
include “a concise general statement of their basis and purpose”). In the words of one treatise,
an agency must set forth the basis and purpose of the rule in a detailed statement, often several hundred pages long, in which the agency refers to the evidentiary basis for all factual predicates, explains its method of reasoning from
factual predicates to the expected effects of the rule, [and] relates the factual
predicates and expected effects of the rule to each of the statutory goals or purposes the agency is required to further or to consider.
I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §7.4, at 442 (4th ed. 2002).
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II. THE POPULARITY OF DISCLOSURE-BASED REGULATION
There are dozens, possibly hundreds, of regulatory schemes that
use disclosure in whole or in part to accomplish their purposes. 7
Regulatory disclosure schemes blossomed in the 1980s under the
Reagan administration as part of a trend to inform and educate
rather than regulate. 8 Disclosure-based regulation has both pragmatic and political justifications. First, it comports with the view
that command-and-control regulation does not work. 9 Moreover, it is
easier to require disclosure than to regulate substantively, 10 which
requires identifying desirable and undesirable behaviors, showing
them to be beneficial or harmful, showing that the proposed regulation will have the desired effect on the behavior, and showing that
the costs of compliance with the regulation and the unintended consequences of the regulation will not outweigh its benefits. 11 Disclosure can be used to regulate even when we are unsure what to regulate, because the decision about behavior is left to a third party, the
target of the disclosure. Also, disclosure moves decision-making away
from the government and down to the individual or firm, which often

7. Mary Graham identifies the following examples of disclosure-based regulation:
drinking water, nutritional content, toxic releases, the presence of lead paint in residential
housing, SUV rollover rates, organically grown and genetically modified foods, workplace
hazards, sweatshop conditions, airline safety incidents, and lending “red-lining” practices.
MARY GRAHAM, INFORMATION AS RISK REGULATION: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 1-4 (Innovations in American Government Program, Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Paper 10-01, 2001), available at http://www.ashinstitute.harvard.edu/Ash/m_graham.pdf;
see also William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1707-10 (1999) (describing deluge of disclosurebased regulations in health care).
8. See Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 159, 159-60 (1984); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999) (noting that regulation by disclosure “has become one of the most striking developments in the last generation of American law”).
9. See Adler & Pittle, supra note 8, at 160-61; see also GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 1
(noting that “[a]t a time when distrust and downsizing of government are dominant
themes, [mandatory information disclosure] is gaining prominence”); Sage, supra note 7, at
1714; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 625.
10. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 163 (1982); Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 527 (2004). Disclosure schemes can also be used
when direct regulation is impossible. For example, the proposed V-chip system combines a
rating system with parental control technology in a situation where the First Amendment
prohibits direct regulation. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 621.
11. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 10, at 101-09 (describing the standard-setting process); PIERCE, supra note 6, §7.1, at 413 (discussing court interpretations of the “arbitrary
and capricious” standard requiring agencies to explain the reasoning behind a rule
and to respond to all major comments and alternatives); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO . L.J. 257, 272-76 (2001) (describing the difficulties of
environmental regulation).
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permits more efficient decision-making. 12
Second, disclosure schemes comport with the prevailing political
philosophy in that disclosure preserves individual choice while avoiding direct governmental interference. 13 Disclosure is a “soft” form of
intervention that does not directly mandate change in the underlying
behavior. 14 In other words, it is a form of civil regulation—regulation
by society, not the government. 15 Moreover, disclosure-based regulation appeals to those with a promarket political orientation because
it addresses market failure without disturbing other beneficial features of the market. 16
In addition, disclosure-based regulation may reflect a changing
political dynamic. 17 The insights of public choice theory apply to statutes requiring disclosure as well as to any other kind of statute, and
it may be that the increase in regulation by disclosure reflects an improved ability by regulated groups to use the legislative process to
avoid direct regulation. 18 Similarly, the adoption of less intrusive disclosure schemes by regulators may reflect increased influence by
regulated parties on agency rulemaking. 19
III. DISCLOSURE UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS
The archetype of the use of disclosure as a regulatory scheme is
the system established by the securities acts. The Securities Act of
1933 requires disclosure of a wide range of specified information
about the issuer of a security before the security can be sold to the
public, 20 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that publicly traded companies periodically provide specified information to

12. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 293.
13. See id.; GRAHAM supra note 7, at 11; Sage, supra note 7, at 1707.
14. John Parkinson, Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance:
Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 3, 4 (2003).
15. See id.
16. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1706-07, 1796-97 (relating an anecdote illustrating the
importance of couching disclosure as a mechanism for supporting a market).
17. See WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO
REGULATION 1 (1992) (noting rise of right-to-know movement and increased skepticism
about command-and-control regulation in the 1970s); Sage, supra note 7, at 1772 (noting
relative ease of enacting disclosure requirements); id. at 1828 (noting temptation to use
disclosure as a “placeholder solution” to difficult political problems).
18. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 614 n.7.
19. See MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE 140 (2002) (describing industry
support for disclosure requirements); cf. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct:
Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 610-13 (2005) (making a
similar point about the growth in the number of regimes limiting organizational criminal
liability where the organization has adopted compliance policies).
20. See Securities Act of 1933 §5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000) (requiring registration
statement); Form S-1 Registration Statement, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶7121, at 6237-2
(describing contents).
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shareholders and the marketplace. 21 Although almost everyone
agrees that the fundamental philosophy of the securities acts is disclosure, 22 the operation of that regulatory mechanism, and even its
purpose, is less clear.
A. Purposes
1. Reducing Informational Asymmetries
The purpose of securities disclosure is often stated to be providing
more information to investors. 23 Alternatively, the policy can be described as remedying information asymmetries that existed between
investors, on the one hand, and issuers and promoters of securities,
on the other, before 1933. 24 Because information asymmetries cause
market participants to demand compensatory premia, a disclosure
policy that reduces those asymmetries will improve the price-setting
function of the market. 25 According to a congressional report, the securities acts are based on the proposition that the independent
judgments of buyers and sellers in a securities market will best determine accurate prices for securities if those buyers and sellers have
adequate information. 26 Thus, disclosure is essential to the functioning of the capital markets because “the most efficient allocation of resources will occur when the information is sufficient for the purposes
of those making decisions, when it is reliable, and when it is disseminated in a timely manner.” 27 Pricing risk is one of the essential
functions of the securities markets, and disclosure of information improves market participants’ ability to assess and price risk.
Also, by making information available to all, rather than allowing
it to be distributed unevenly to selected market participants in a
manner that would be perceived to be unfair, 28 disclosure require21. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§13, 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78m, 78n (2000).
22. This fact is more newsworthy than one might think. See Strassel, supra note 4.
23. See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL
OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE ’33 AND ’34 ACTS (THE WHEAT REPORT)
10, 46, 49 (1969) [hereinafter THE WHEAT REPORT] (noting that national securities policy
emphasizes disclosure because one main purpose of securities regulation is providing investors and speculators access to information).
24. See Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the
Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 649-50 (1995).
Broker-dealer regulation is also directed at informational asymmetries between investors
and market professionals. See id.
25. See Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance:
The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 346-48, 368 (2003). See generally Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97, 101-40 (2001) (describing in detail various
economic models of investor behavior that help describe the effect of disclosure on prices).
26. H.R. REP. NO. 98-910, vol. 1, at 563, 574-75 (1977) [hereinafter SEC 1977
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT].
27. Id.
28. See id. at 632.
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ments can increase public confidence in the market. Mandatory disclosure 29 requirements also ensure that disclosed information is
standardized and, therefore, more easily comparable. 30 Finally, disclosure requirements assure investors that additional information
will be available on a regular and timely basis.
These goals all involve enhancing the function of the securities
markets. The SEC, however, also considers its mission to be the protection of investors. 31 Those goals are not the same and may not even
be purely complementary. Market efficiency may be enhanced, for
example, when investors’ mistakes are punished by losses and investors have the opportunity to learn to invest more rationally or to stay
out of the market and leave the decision-making to experts.32 Modern
portfolio theory suggests that any rational investor will hold a welldiversified mix of common stocks and other investments. 33 Should securities regulations be designed with those investors in mind or
should the SEC be concerned with protecting the nondiversified investor, who may be at greater risk? 34 Also, regulation of different
kinds of investments may be directed at different kinds of investors.
Hedge fund investors, for example, tend to be wealthy and sophisticated, while mutual fund investors tend to be middle class and unsophisticated. 35 And, as discussed below, the relevant audience for most
securities disclosure is not investors at all, but informational and

29. There has long been a debate about whether securities disclosure should be mandatory. See generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 180-88 (3d
ed. 1989) (discussing the debate).
30. See Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory Disclosure?, 29 J. CORP. L. 699, 703-04 (2004).
31. According to its website, “[t]he mission of the [SEC] is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last
visited Nov. 12, 2007).
32. See Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of the
Research Analyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 74 (2006).
33. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 185 n.42.
34. This debate was illustrated by an exchange between participants at the Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. See Podcast: Do the Benefits of Securities Regulation in the United States Warrant the Costs?, held by the Section on Securities Regulation, Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.aals.org/am2006/program/wednesday.html). Erik Sirri, Director of the SEC’s
Division of Market Regulation and former SEC Chief Economist, who was at the time a
Professor of Finance at Babson College, remarked, “[I]f . . . from a regulatory perspective—
for . . . disclosure and other things—you were to work with the assumption that investors
are diversified, I think you’d have a very different framework for how you approach securities regulation. A lot of things are built around a different assumption . . . .” Id. Richard
Booth, Professor of Law, University of Maryland, interjected, “[A]nd, I would say, incorrectly.” Id. Professor Sirri responded, “ ‘[I]nvestor protection’ isn’t cast as ‘investor protection for diversified investors.’ It’s ‘investor protection.’ ” Id.
35. See Henry T.C. Hu, The New Portfolio Society, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and
the Public Corporation Model, 60 BUS. LAW. 1303, 1307, 1357-58 (2005).
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market intermediaries. In sum, the goal of providing information to
investors is less straightforward than one might think.
2. Regulating Lawful Conduct
Further complicating the picture of the purpose of securities regulation are those who argue that the disclosure requirements of the
securities acts are also intended to deter undesirable conduct. 36
Commentators describing the origins of the disclosure requirements
of the securities acts frequently quote Louis Brandeis, that
“[s]unlight is . . . the best of disinfectants.” 37 For example, the securities acts sought to address the problem of excessive insider and underwriter compensation, including conflict-of-interest transactions, by “emphasiz[ing] publicity of insiders’ compensation.” 38 According to Brandeis, if brokers’ fees and commissions are unreasonable, investors will refuse to invest with them and the brokers
will change their policies. 39
Recent initiatives by the SEC and Congress, while continuing to
use disclosure as the primary means of regulating financial markets
and the participants therein, increasingly appear to be intended to
affect firms’ behavior. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 40
which was enacted in response to financial scandals at a number of
companies in the early 2000s, provides an example of this. SOX requires, among other things, that a publicly traded firm disclose
whether it has a financial expert on its audit committee and whether
it has an ethics code for senior executives. 41 Neither SOX nor the
36. According to an SEC Report, a “less direct” consideration underlying securities
disclosure is that “publicity tends to deter questionable practices.” THE WHEAT REPORT,
supra note 23, at 10; see also id. at 50-51 (noting that disclosure helps eliminate “conflicts
of interest and questionable business practices”); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and
Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 129496 (1999). Williams argues at length about the legitimacy of requiring corporations to disclose “social” information (such as environmental effects). See id. at 1273-1311. However,
she limits the discussion of the utility of that information to two pages—mentioning that
disclosure will enable shareholders to understand the tradeoffs made between economic
benefits and social or environmental harms, will encourage managers to improve because
“managers ‘manage what they measure,’ ” and will encourage good behavior because people want to look good in the press. See id. at 1294-96.
37. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(reprint 1971) (2d ed. 1932).
38. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System,
9 J. CORP. L. 1, 45-46 (1983).
39. See BRANDEIS, supra note 37, at 101-04.
40. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7264-65 (Supp. 2004). According to the SEC, the purpose of the rules
was to create “greater transparency,” “to improve the quality of information available to
investors,” and to “assist the market to properly value securities, which in turn should lead
to more efficient allocation of capital resources.” Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406
and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 8177, Exchange Act
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rules promulgated thereunder require firms to have such an expert
or an ethics code; however, a firm that does not must disclose why it
does not. 42 If the purpose of required disclosure is to provide investors with the information they need to make informed investment
decisions, this new requirement makes sense only if the presence
of an audit committee expert or an ethics code is relevant to the
investment decision. 43 Given the amount of information already
being disclosed, it is more likely that the unspoken purpose of the
requirement is to force companies to appoint audit committee experts and adopt ethics codes.
Recent efforts to improve disclosure of executive compensation 44
are also aimed at changing conduct. 45 The use of disclosure to rein in
executive compensation dates back to the original enactment of the
securities laws, which envisioned that disclosure of insider compensation not only would “alert potential investors that specific firms
Release No. 47235, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,818, at
86,901 (Jan. 23, 2003).
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7264-65.
43. Theoretically, a wide variety of nonfinancial information might affect the riskiness of an investment and therefore its price. Information about corporate governance, executive compensation, and conflicts of interest might all fall into this category. However,
evidence and theory also suggest that decision-makers base their decisions on a limited
number of factors and that the quality of decisions declines as information on more factors
becomes available. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the link
between corporate governance and financial performance has not been conclusively established. See Bernard S. Black et al., Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market
Value?: Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 366, 367 (2006); Phyllis Plitch, Moving
the Market: S&P Quits Rating Corporate Governance in U.S., WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2005,
at C3; Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Listing
Standards 17-19 (Univ. Cal. L. Sch., L.A., Research Paper No. 02-15, 2002), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=317121 (surveying empirical literature regarding independent directors and shareholder value).
44. See generally Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg.
6542, 6542 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 228-40, 245, 249, 274),
available at http://www.iasplus.com/usa/0601seccompensation.pdf (amendments “intended
to provide . . . a clearer and more complete picture of [executive] compensation”).
45. The SEC has this to say about the possible effects on executive compensation
practices of the new disclosure requirements:
We believe that the extent to which increased transparency and completeness
in executive and director compensation disclosure would result in broader
benefits depends at least in part on the extent to which current executive and
director compensation practices are aligned with the interests of investors as
reflected in their investment and voting decisions. Any changes to a company
that might occur, including changes in corporate governance, changes in control, changes in the employment of particular executives or other changes could
depend to some extent on the degree to which improved transparency in executive and director compensation would affect investors’ decision-making with respect to that company.
. . . We emphasize that we are not seeking to foster any given directional or
other impacts. Our objective is to increase transparency to enable decisionmakers to make more informed decisions, which could result in different policies or practices or increase investor confidence in existing policies or practices.
Id. at 6591.
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have relatively high levels of direct or indirect executive compensation, but also provide existing investors with evidence that could be
employed in state unfairness or waste actions.” 46 SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox, commenting on the rules proposed in 2006, noted
that disclosure of executive compensation is “ ‘at the heart of [the
SEC’s] disclosure mission,’ ” 47 that “ ‘[t]he market is capable of disciplining excessive compensation, provided that the market has adequate information,’ ” 48 and that it is “ ‘important that investors and
consumers have all the information they need in order to obtain the
best possible services from executives and managers at the lowest
possible price.’ ” 49
3. Other Purposes
Whatever else may be debatable about the purpose of securities
disclosure, it is quite clear that the acts were not intended to regulate securities based on their merits or financial soundness. 50 The desire to avoid merit regulation is a reflection of a belief that investors,
not the government, should decide where capital should be invested. 51 According to this view, investors invest in worthless securities not because they are irrational, but because they lack information or are defrauded. 52 Once adequate information is available,
there will be no need to regulate the quality of investments.
Commentators also attribute other purposes to the disclosure requirements of the securities acts, such as preventing fraud and facilitating its detection and prosecution. 53 Much of the impetus for the
passage of the securities acts was the prevalence of misrepresentation in the stock market, either by direct falsehood or by omission, 54
particularly by investment banks and underwriters. 55 It is not clear,
however, how disclosure requirements serve to prevent fraud. Presumably, someone who is willing to commit fraud in a nondisclosure
46. See Seligman, supra note 38, at 51.
47. SEC’s New Leader Shares His Views on Range of Issues, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19,
2005, at A13 (published excerpts from interview with Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman).
48. Kara Scannell, SEC to Propose Overhaul of Rules on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 10, 2006, at A1.
49. SEC’s New Leader Shares His Views on Range of Issues, supra note 47.
50. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 50-56, 22930, 565-67 (rev. ed. 1995) (describing prevailing disclosure philosophy of securities laws, as
opposed to regulation that would have given government the power to prohibit the sale of
unsound investments).
51. “The purpose of the [Act] . . . is to protect the public with the least possible interference to honest business.” President’s Message, Mar. 29, 1933, S. REP. NO. 47, 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933), quoted in SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
26, at 556-57.
52. SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 562.
53. Seligman, supra note 38, at 18.
54. See id. at 18-33.
55. See id. at 24.
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world will be willing to create false information once disclosure is required. However, disclosure requirements can increase the effort required to commit fraud. In order to satisfy the market’s demands
where there are extensive disclosure requirements, defrauders must
construct fundamental aspects of business and “present a veneer of
plausibility.” 56 The disclosure system presumably also provides earlier warning that things are going wrong. 57 In addition, as the
amount of information available in the marketplace increases, the
likelihood that individual pieces of false information will be able to
mislead anyone decreases. 58 For example, the irregularities at Enron
were first uncovered by analysts and journalists relying on publicly
disclosed information. 59 This fact does not, however, go to prove that
disclosure requirements can prevent fraud.
There are other incidental purposes to securities disclosure in addition to preventing fraud. Disclosure requirements can improve corporate governance. As one commentator has noted,
It provides directors more information by which they can evaluate
the strength of the company and the performance of the officers; it
strengthens the role of auditors in their own watchdog role; it enhances the effectiveness of shareholder voting and shareholder
litigation as constraints on corporate governance; and it permits
the governmental oversight agencies to perform more effectively. 60

Information can also alleviate agency problems between promoters
and managers, on the one hand, and investors, on the other. 61

56. See Larry E. Ribstein, Commentary, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 80 (2003).
57. See Seligman, supra note 38, at 56.
58. See Andy Kessler, Show Me the Books, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at A10.
59. Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 97, 105-06 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); see also John
R. Emshwiller, Opening the Books: Corporate Disclosure Has Come a Long Way over the
Decades, but It Still Has a Ways to Go, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R6 (noting that
“some of the questionable activities that helped sink Enron . . . had been publicly disclosed by the company”).
60. Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 99, 111
(2003). The 1977 Advisory Committee on disclosure adopted the view (albeit by a narrow
margin) that the proxy rules should provide information about governance matters, because the board is the monitor of management and shareholders must be able to assess the
board’s performance in order to make voting decisions. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at D-22.
61. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048-50 (1995). Mahoney argues that disclosure requirements addressed to agency problems are much more likely to be effective than general information
aimed at investor decision-making because the former facilitates bilateral bargaining while
the latter must act in a complex web of transactions among many parties, a situation in
which governmental intervention is not generally effective. See id. at 1089-90.
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B. Mechanism of Operation
Assuming that the goal of securities regulation is to improve the
functioning of financial markets while protecting investors in the
process, the mechanism by which securities disclosure accomplishes
that goal is relatively clear precisely because the targets of the disclosure are participants in a well-organized market. Registration under the 1933 Act makes extensive information available to investors
prior to their decision to purchase a security being offered to the public by the issuer. 62 After an issuer files a preliminary registration
statement and prospectus with the SEC, there is a waiting period
during which public communications about the offered security are
restricted. 63 This waiting period prevents issuers and underwriters from engaging in aggressive, abbreviated, and misleading selling efforts while the market (or, more specifically, analysts and
other professionals) digests the information in the preliminary
prospectus. 64 The waiting period also gives individuals time to
consider before investing. 65
Disclosure requirements in the secondary market are governed by
the 1934 Act. 66 The 1934 Act has a different focus because it was
thought that the investor in the secondary market did not have to be
protected from the aggressive sales tactics used by underwriters in
the primary market. 67 As long as the information was available to a
sufficient number of market participants to set accurate prices, it
had accomplished its purpose. 68 Thus, full periodic reports, including

62. This process is rather imperfect: the registration statement, which is filed with
the SEC, provides extensive information only to those who seek it out. The prospectus,
which must be delivered to a purchaser prior to the sale, contains less extensive information although it is still voluminous. Certain issuers can avoid the burdensome disclosure
requirements of the 1933 Act through private placements and shelf registrations, which
adversely affects the efficacy of the disclosure system to some degree. In addition, the SEC
has recently adopted a new regulatory system for “well-known seasoned issuers” that is intended to reduce the burdens of registration without reducing the information available to
the public. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act
Release No. 52056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26993, [2005-2006 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶87,421, at 82,373 (Jul. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Securities
Offering Reform].
63. The waiting period is twenty days by statute, but that time is subject to extension
or acceleration. See Securities Act of 1933 § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (2000).
64. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 568-69, 570.
65. See THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 129-30. Thus, the complexity of the investment is supposed to be a factor in considering a request to accelerate the effective time
of the registration statement. Id. at 78-79.
66. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 226 (3d ed. 1998).
67. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 575; see also THE
WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 57-61 (discussing how primary market differs from secondary market); cf. THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 50 (discussing the importance of
information in the secondary markets).
68. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 574-75.
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the annual “10-K,” are filed with the SEC. 69 Only abbreviated material, such as the “glossy” annual report, is sent to shareholders. 70 The
periodic reporting system provides a minimum of available information and “encourage[s] willingness on the part of issuers to keep the
market place informed.” 71
The content of required securities disclosure is determined by the
SEC through the usual rulemaking process, which includes opportunity for public comment. The SEC has made efforts to reduce the
burden of disclosure on some issuers 72 and to streamline disclosure
requirements—for example, by adopting in 1982 the integrated disclosure system for the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 73 As a general rule, however, the amount of information required to be disclosed has increased
over the years. 74 Although fraud liability under the acts is limited to
material misrepresentations or omissions, there is no requirement
that information subject to mandatory disclosure be material.75
How is all this information expected to improve the market and
protect investors? Ideally, investors would receive it, carefully analyze it, and make investment decisions based on their analysis. Their
market activity would then move security prices to more accurate levels. However, few investors have the time or expertise to make appropriate use of the available information. Therefore, an essential
part of the mechanism by which securities disclosure operates to improve the function of the market and protect investors is the activity of
intermediaries. There are two kinds of intermediaries in the securities
markets, financial intermediaries and informational intermediaries.
Market-makers and other professional investors determine the
prices at which securities trade, and therefore it is the information
69. See Form 10-K Annual Report Pursuant to §13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Instruction D), 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶31,101, at 22,062 (describing filing requirement).
70. See Rule 14c-3 under the Securities Exchange Act, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶24,203 (describing information to be included in Annual Report); Form 10-K (Instruction
G(2)), Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶31,101, at 22,063 (allowing incorporation by reference to
annual report to security holders).
71. THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 332.
72. See, e.g., Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (Aug. 13, 1992) (simplifying requirements for small businesses).
73. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383,
Exchange Act Release No. 18524, Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 22407,
Trust Indenture Act Release No. 700, Investment Company Act Release No. 12264, [Accounting Series Releases 1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,328, at
62,990 (Mar. 3, 1982).
74. The recent overhaul of registration requirements does not reduce the amount of
information disclosed; rather, it streamlines the process for “well-known seasoned issuers”
on the assumption that adequate information is already available to the market. See Securities Offering Reform, supra note 62, at 82,373.
75. Information is “material” under the securities acts when “there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” in making a decision. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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available to them that determines the accuracy of those prices. 76 If
those prices are accurate, even investors who completely ignore the
disclosed information will nevertheless be protected if they trade on
the basis of price. 77 The market itself is therefore a financial intermediary. 78 Moreover, mutual funds and other managed investments
allow unsophisticated investors to channel their investment activity
through professional financial intermediaries.
Like financial intermediaries, informational intermediaries are
essential to the functioning of the securities disclosure system. These
actors select, analyze, and disseminate a more manageable version of
disclosed information. 79 Securities analysts, portfolio managers, the
financial press, rating agencies (who tend to provide useful selection
and formatting functions), and “registered representatives” such as
brokers and financial advisors all provide digested information to the
general public or unsophisticated investor. 80 In 1973, 46.8% of investors reported using stockbrokers for information they used in investment decisions, another 15.6% used advisory services, and 9.7%
got their information from friends and relatives. 81 Although the use
of professional advice has declined, intermediaries are still important. In 2002, 51% of investors owning individual stocks (other than
through employer-sponsored retirement plans) said they relied on
advice from a professional financial advisor when making investment
decisions. 82 Therefore, the integrity and competence of the disseminators is essential. 83 Not surprisingly, both issuers and the SEC consider
76. See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Market Microstructure and Market Efficiency, 28
J. CORP. L. 541 (2003) (discussing the complex mechanism occurring within the market by
market-makers and others); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach
to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2378 (1998) (noting that institutional investors are better able to process market information than the SEC and have more financial
incentives to do so).
77. In the vocabulary of the mechanisms of market efficiency, intermediaries create
“professionally informed trading” and “derivatively informed trading,” that is, trading by
those who observe price shifts caused by professionally informed traders. See Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later:
The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 721 (2003).
78. See Hu, supra note 35, at 1355.
79. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at xi; Stephen J.
Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 45, 46-47 (2004).
80. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at D-9, 312-14, 564
n.11; THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 10, 52-54.
81. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 243-44.
82. See INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 77 (2002).
The percentages were higher for investors who owned stock through employer-sponsored
retirement plans or who owned mutual funds. Id. at 87, 95.
83. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 166-70 (2002) (describing analysts’ biases); see also THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 319-23 (discussing obligations of broker-dealers to investigate and consult information before making recommendations). Before the promulgation of Regulation Financial Disclosure (FD), which re-

2007]

USE AND MISUSE OF DISCLOSURE

1103

the needs of analysts and other professionals in designing disclosure
requirements and preparing disclosure documents. 84
If the goal of securities disclosure is not to improve market operation and investor decision-making, but rather to deter lawful conduct, the mechanism by which disclosure will accomplish that goal is
somewhat different. Disclosure still operates by affecting the market,
but in this case an important additional feature of the market is
competition. For example, investors may pay more for shares of companies with audit committee experts, which would encourage all
companies to appoint such experts. 85 Regulation Analyst Certification (AC), which requires analysts to disclose their compensation and
to certify that they actually believe the views they express, is intended to improve the quality of analysts’ research by creating competition between analysts based on the absence of compensationrelated conflicts of interest. 86 Similarly, the SEC’s proposed rules on
enhanced disclosure to investors in mutual funds are intended to
promote better-informed investment decision-making in light of the
perceived lack of adequate information available to investors about
distribution-related costs and arrangements that create conflicts of
interest between investors and brokers. 87 The availability of such information will presumably allow investors to select funds based on

quires that any material nonpublic information disclosed to securities market professionals
or securityholders also be disclosed to the public, corporate executives could use information as a commodity to influence particular analysts or investors. See Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43154,
Investment Company Act Release No. 24599, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,677 (Aug. 15, 2000); cf. Deborah Solomon & Robert Frank, ‘You
Don’t Like Our Stock? You Are Off the List’—SEC Sets New Front on Conflicts by Taking
Aim at Companies that Retaliate Against Analysts, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2003, at C1 (describing practice by some firms of punishing analysts who make negative reports about
their stock).
84. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5, 11.
85. This seems an implausible scenario. More likely, the SEC is relying on some reputational mechanism for this particular goal. Cf. Joann S. Lublin & Kara Scannell, They
Say Jump: SEC Plans Tougher Pay Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at C1 (quoting former SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner that disclosure of executive compensation will not
reduce compensation unless shareholders act on the information).
86. See Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 8193, Exchange
Act Release No. 47384, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,833, at
87,247 (Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Regulation Analyst Certification]. The disclosure is also
intended to allow investors to better determine the quality of an analyst’s research. See id.;
see also SELIGMAN, supra note 50, at 372-73 (describing effort in 1960s to use disclosure to
improve competition in mutual funds).
87. Proposed Rule: Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements for Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, and Other
Confirmation Requirement Amendments, and Amendments to the Registration Form for
Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8358, Exchange Act Release No. 49148, Investment Act Release No. 26341, [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
87,135, at 89,008 (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Proposed Rule: Mutual Fund Disclosure].
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those criteria and thereby pressure funds to change their policies. 88
C. Limitations on Effectiveness
Despite the fact that securities disclosure is almost universally esteemed as a model for regulation by disclosure, there are important
limits to its effectiveness. First, disclosure will only be useful if its
recipients can process and understand the disclosed information. 89
This is a particular problem for equity markets, which have extensive participation by ordinary citizens in transactions involving increasingly complex financial arrangements. 90 The SEC and others
involved in financial disclosure are therefore seeking to improve the
usefulness of disclosure by more carefully designing the format of information. 91 In 1998, the SEC adopted rules requiring disclosure
documents to be written in “plain English.” 92 The proposed changes
to the executive compensation disclosure requirements are specifically intended to make the information easily understandable. 93 In
proposing mutual fund fee and commission disclosure, the SEC specifically addressed and solicited comments on the format of the information 94 and the timing and form of the disclosure. These concerns would be lessened, of course, if disclosure were targeted directly to intermediaries. The SEC’s focus on investor protection,
however, requires that investors still be considered the audience
for disclosed information.
The ability of financial intermediaries to serve their role in setting
accurate prices depends on the market being efficient—that is, on
prices reflecting available information. But the market may not be ef88. For a sharp criticism of the SEC’s mutual fund disclosure regime, see Hu, supra
note 35.
89. See THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 78-80; William O. Douglas, Protecting
the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 523-24 (1934).
90. See Douglas, supra note 89, at 527 (noting that equity investments are by their
nature risky and complicated and arguing that it will be almost impossible to write an understandable prospectus about them); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure
Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 12-19 (arguing that some
transactions may be too complex for a disclosure system to regulate); see also Jesse Eisinger, Ahead of the Tape: Misunderstood, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2003, at C1 (noting that
“[i]t’s not a coincidence that some of the biggest blowups, like Enron and Tyco International, have been hard [for analysts] to cover”).
91. See Hu, supra note 35, at 1345 (describing effort to design useful format for
information).
92. See generally Plain English Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 7497, Exchange Act Release No. 39593, Investment Company Act Release No. 23011, [1998 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,003, at 80,127 (Jan. 28, 1998) (requiring prospectuses to be written in plain English).
93. Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542,
6542 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 228-40, 245, 249, 274), available at http://www.iasplus.com/usa/0601seccompensation.pdf (amendments “intended
to provide . . . a clearer and more complete picture of [executive] compensation”).
94. See Proposed Rule: Mutual Fund Disclosure, supra note 87, at 89,008.
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ficient, and there may be limits to the ability of market professionals
to perform the price-setting role assigned to them. 95 In addition, heuristic biases 96 can create bounded rationality in professionals as well
as in ordinary investors. 97 Because the number of shares of a security
outstanding and available to be traded (that is, the size of the “float”)
determines the efficiency of the market for that security, prices of
small issues will be less accurate even with active intermediaries. 98
Arbitrage opportunities, which are essential for efficient markets,
may be limited. 99 Moreover, an increasing proportion of investment
dollars is being placed in portfolios, such as index funds, that are restricted to a specific bundle of stocks for diversification purposes;
those holders, which may own a very large number of shares, cannot
influence the market by their trading behavior. 100
There are also, as we have seen in the past several years, problems with basic informational institutions: managers have incentives
to distort information; reputational intermediaries, such as accountants and lawyers, fail to serve the oversight function expected of
them; and analysts have conflicts of interest. 101 Moreover, securities
analysts do not always do extensive research and sometimes do not
understand the companies they are reviewing. 102 Financial information is increasingly available from a variety of sources of questionable
reliability at an astonishing speed. Improved access to information,
however, may simply give people the chance to be foolish faster.103
95. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 723-35 (describing challenges
to the mechanisms of market efficiency posed by investor irrationality and limited arbitrage opportunities).
96. See infra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
97. See ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE 12-13 (2000); Schwarcz, supra note 90, at 17-19. For an exploration of the limits
on rational behavior by investors generally, see Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J.
1397, 1454-89 (2002); see also Langevoort, supra note 83, at 154-55 (providing examples).
98. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 735-36.
99. See id.; see also SHLEIFER, supra note 97, at 13-16, 51-52, 89-90.
100. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25922, [2002-2003 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,826, at 87,144-45 (Jan. 31, 2003) [hereinafter
Proxy Voting Policies].
101. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 736-37; see also supra note 83 (describing corporate influence on analysts).
102. See Harvey L. Pitt, How to Prevent Future Enrons, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2001, at
A18; see also Langevoort, supra note 83, at 149-52 (discussing limits on financial analyst
performance, including agency costs and heuristic biases such as overconfidence, and questioning whether analysts have any effect on the market at all).
103. See EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
SPECULATION 237-40 (1999); Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7-10 (2004). Furthermore, Regulation FD is specifically intended to bring directly to the public information that
was previously filtered through intermediaries. See supra note 83.
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Also, recent advances in technology may lead investors to rely less
on professional advice and to rely instead on raw or untested data
from the Internet 104 or to follow investment trends blindly (otherwise
known as engaging in “herd behavior”) because they are incapable of
making reasoned decisions in an increasingly complex environment. 105 It is now much easier, and cheaper, for small investors to
purchase securities without the assistance of a professional. Publicity
about analysts’ conflicts of interest and the unreliability of their recommendations may also contribute to a decline in the use of professional advice. 106 The result of these trends may be, perversely, to decrease the effectiveness of securities disclosure by eliminating its
primary mechanism, the filtering and processing of complex information by sophisticated financial professionals. In addition, a decline in
the use of intermediaries by individual investors may also adversely
affect the price-setting function of market professionals, because it
may increase “noise trading” as investors react to information in unsophisticated ways. 107
Finally, the availability and comprehensibility of disclosed information is insufficient to make information useful if it does not relate
to an issue considered salient by its intended audience, whether the
audience is individual investors or intermediaries. One commentator
has suggested that stock option expense was ignored by financial
analysts not because the information was unavailable or because it
was too speculative but because it was not interesting: analysts cared
only about earnings. 108 It remains to be seen whether increased
disclosure about corporate governance practices will prove salient
to investors and intermediaries. 109 Information that is not salient
to analysts and other financial intermediaries will not provide the
benefits envisioned by the disclosure system, no matter how
clearly it is disclosed.
D. Substitution for Direct Regulation
As indicated above, a supplemental purpose of securities regulation is the regulation of lawful behavior. To the extent disclosure is
aimed at this purpose, it is attempting to substitute for direct regulation. The SEC’s director-nomination proposals provide a clear exam-

104. Langevoort, supra note 83, at 154.
105. See Schwarcz, supra note 90, at 15.
106. As of 2002, reliance on professional investment advice had declined markedly
from levels reported in 1973. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
107. See Langevoort, supra note 103, at 9; Langevoort, supra note 83, at 172-75.
108. Comments of Susan Lee, Wall Street Journal Editorial Board (CNBC television
broadcast Aug. 9, 2002).
109. See Ken Brown & Robin Sidel, Scoring Boards on Governance Has Its Risks, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at C1; Plitch, supra note 43; see also Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 16-17.
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ple of this phenomenon. In response to a perceived unwillingness by
corporations to respond to shareholders’ concerns, the SEC proposed
to create a new substantive right allowing shareholders to nominate
directors under certain circumstances. 110 The proposal received widespread criticism and was shelved. In its place the SEC adopted a disclosure-based regulation, with the stated goals of increasing investor
“understanding” of the director nomination process and permitting
investors to evaluate the nominating committee of the board. 111 The
SEC also described a goal of “increasing security holder understanding of . . . board accountability, board responsiveness, and . . . corporate governance policies,” 112 policies that would appear to be outside
the usual market-enhancing purpose of securities disclosure.
Similarly, the SEC has required that mutual funds disclose their
proxy voting policies and actual voting practices, purportedly to enhance “transparency” but also to encourage mutual funds to exert
more pressure on management of the companies whose stock they
own and thereby to improve corporate governance. 113 Most recently,
the proposed changes to disclosure requirements for executive compensation are expressly intended not only to increase “transparency”
but also to enable the “market” to “discipline” excessive compensation. 114 In other words, where the SEC does not have the authority or
the political will to regulate directly, it can use a disclosure system to
accomplish the underlying regulatory goal through the actions of intermediaries and investors in the financial markets.
In sum, securities disclosure has three goals: protecting investors
110. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48626, Investment Company Act Release No. 26206, [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 87,101, at 88,401 (Oct. 14, 2003).
111. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Securities Act Release No. 8340, Exchange Act Release No. 48825, Investment Company Act Release No. 26262, [2003-2004
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,116, at 88,719, 88,722 (Nov. 24, 2004).
112. See id. at 88,722. The reaction of commenters about whether actual improvement
was likely to occur was mixed. See id.
113. The SEC has stated that requiring funds to disclose their proxy voting policies
will “enable fund shareholders to monitor their funds’ involvement in the governance activities of portfolio companies, which may have a dramatic impact on shareholder value.”
Proxy Voting Policies, supra note 100, at 87,144. Similarly, the SEC has opined that institutions holding shares as fiduciaries would violate their fiduciary duty under the Investment Advisers Act by having a policy of always voting with management. See Proxy Voting
by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2106, [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,825, at 87,132 (Jan. 31, 2003). The SEC has sent a clear
message that it wants not simply to make shareholder activism possible, but to “encourage
funds to become more engaged in corporate governance of issuers held in their portfolios,
which may benefit all investors and not just fund shareholders.” Proxy Voting Policies, supra note 100, at 87,146; see also Ken Brown, Vanguard Gives Corporate Chiefs a Report
Card, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at C1 (describing Vanguard’s recent willingness to vote
against cooperate management).
114. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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by improving their decision-making; improving the price-setting
function of the market; and, sometimes, altering firms’ behavior. It is
able to accomplish at least the first two of those goals because it operates in an ideal environment: the capital markets and related financial institutions. A wide variety of intermediaries and a (relatively) efficient market combine to process the disclosed information
and turn it into a single signal, the price of a security, which can
then be used by investors in making investment decisions. The nature of investing is such that investors are likely to be as rational as
anyone ever is, even if that rationality is significantly imperfect. In
addition, investors often seek expert advice. Thus, the context in
which securities disclosure serves as regulation is quite unusual. For
example, none of these features are available for a consumer deciding
to purchase a refrigerator or a salad dressing. 115
IV. DISCLOSURE AS REGULATION
There are many, extremely varied examples of uses of disclosure
as regulation in contexts other than securities law. Their purposes
also vary, although most are intended either to reduce information
asymmetries in an existing market or to change someone’s behavior.
The mechanisms by which they operate or are intended to operate
are rarely explicit, and an examination of those mechanisms reveals
some of the disadvantages and limitations of disclosure systems.
A. Purposes
1. Providing Information in an Existing Market
Many disclosure schemes are intended simply to provide information to decision-makers who are presumed to have a preexisting need
for the information, usually because they are about to engage in an
economic transaction in some market. 116 The disclosure system seeks
to improve the ability of that market to aggregate preferences and efficiently set prices. 117 Information asymmetries impede market efficiency and result in a great deal of economic activity directed at

115. But see Strassel, supra note 4 (quoting SEC Chair Christopher Cox that his goal
for the disclosure system is “for consumers to be able to make the same sort of comparison
they can do when they are buying a car or other products” and marveling at the prospect of
“[a]n America that isn’t scared to invest, but views a visit to the SEC web site as akin to
browsing Consumer Reports”).
116. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 470 (2002) (describing situations in which actors react
to information asymmetries).
117. The ability of an actor to make rational decisions depends on the actor’s knowing
the possible outcomes and their probabilities. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Domain of
Preference, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 717, 719-20 (2003) (describing decision-making under certainty, risk, and uncertainty).
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searching for information. 118 Disclosure requirements can improve
the efficiency of a market by increasing the information available to
market participants and reducing search costs. 119 Moreover, disclosure provides market participants with the information they need to
make rational decisions, as opposed to following the herd. 120 In markets with imperfect information, market actions themselves convey
information. In an effort to exploit this fact, market participants alter their behavior and affect the function of the market. 121 Information can reduce this effect. Thus, requiring 122 the disclosure of information can reduce search costs in economic transactions, improve the
efficiency of markets, and provide other social benefits as a consequence of these economic benefits.123
Real estate disclosure requirements are an example of marketfacilitating disclosure. These laws, which require sellers of residential properties to disclose certain information to buyers, reduce informational asymmetries between the usually knowledgeable seller
and the usually uninformed buyer. 124 Nutrition labeling is also in
part aimed at redressing information asymmetries, albeit on a much
smaller scale. Although they do not operate in an economic market,
campaign finance disclosure laws address informational asymme118. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 213,
224 (1961). Institutions and mechanisms can be developed to facilitate search but ignorance can never be completely eliminated. Id. at 224. Stigler also noted that reputation has
value because it decreases search costs. Id.
119. See Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Information, Fairness, and Efficiency in Bargaining, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 155, 155 (Barbara A.
Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 721 (indicating that markets respond more efficiently to public information). Lack of information may
result in market failure to the extent it prevents participants from pricing risk. See MAGAT
& VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 4. However, there are limits to the ability of information to
make markets efficient. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 736-37.
120. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U.
CINN. L. REV. 1023, 1041 (2000).
121. See Stiglitz, supra note 116, at 469-70, 473; see also Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 119, at 157-59 (describing negotiating practices such as strategic delay and strategic representation of one’s own position).
122. Mandatory, rather than voluntary, disclosure is necessary to facilitate market
transactions because it is difficult for the creator of information to appropriate the benefits
of that information to herself, and therefore some desirable information either will not be
generated or will not be disseminated. See Stiglitz, supra note 116, at 463. Also, just as
there are those who will want to create and publish information, there are those who will
want to prevent creation and publication. See id. at 463, 473. Mandatory disclosure can
also help to ensure that information is credible and therefore more useful, see Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening, An Empirical Analysis of Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 153 (2004), and that information
that might otherwise be generated on an individual basis is standardized and therefore
more useful for comparisons. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1741-42.
123. According to Stiglitz, for example, governmental “[r]ight-to-know” laws have been
“an important if imperfect check on government abuses.” See Stiglitz, supra note 116, at 488.
124. See Florrie Young Roberts, Disclosure Duties in Real Estate Sales and Attempts to
Reallocate the Risk, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1, 19 (2001).
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tries; they are intended to provide information to voters to make
them more “competent”—that is, more informed and therefore better
able to ensure that their votes match their preferences. 125 This use of
disclosure is not aimed at altering the outcome of decisions, only at
improving the decision-making process, and it can be used in a wide
variety of nonmarket and market contexts, including labor markets,
capital markets, and product markets.
2. Regulating Lawful Conduct
The other common goal of disclosure-based regulation is altering
lawful behavior, such as the production of pollutants, 126 the use of labor practices, 127 the use of agricultural techniques, 128 the production
of household goods and services, 129 and even food consumption. 130 A
similar goal is to improve the quality or reduce the price of an existing product or service. Health care disclosure systems such as hospital “report cards” are intended to improve quality, 131 as are restaurant hygiene disclosure requirements. 132 Recent proposals to post the
prices charged by health care providers are intended to lower the
costs of health care. 133 These requirements are also aimed at informational asymmetries but with the expectation that remedying those
asymmetries will result not only in better decision-making but in
better decisions and better behavior.
3. Providing Information for Government Operations
Some disclosure requirements are intended to be used by and im125. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 296 (2005).
126. For example, the Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI), 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000), requires firms to disclose releases of specified toxic substances. See Karkkainen, supra note
11, at 286. The information is standardized and publicly available. See id. The TRI is considered a resounding success; toxic releases have fallen nearly in half since creation of the
TRI. See id. at 287-88.
127. See David J. Doorey, Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labour Practices Through
Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 355-57 (2005).
128. See Margaret Gilhooley, Reexamining the Labeling for Biotechnology in Foods:
The Species Connection, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1088, 1101-02 (2004).
129. See Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25249.6 (West 1999) (requiring products to carry labels if they contain substances
“known to the state [of California] to cause cancer”).
130. The Nutrition Education and Labeling Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2000), requires food processors to label their products with information about specified nutrients.
The format for the information is standardized, and the Food and Drug Administration
oversees the details of nutrition labeling. See 21 C.F.R. pt 101 (2006).
131. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1707-10, 1715-20.
132. See generally Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product
Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q.J. ECON. 409, 410 (2003)
(describing requirement that restaurants post hygiene report cards and its effect).
133. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Insurer Reveals What Doctors Really Charge, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 18, 2005, at D1.
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prove the operation of the government itself. Regulators need information to design and enforce direct regulation systems. 134 This information may not be broadly published, 135 although such information is increasingly available electronically to anyone who looks for
it. 136 Disclosure intended to inform citizens or consumers about their
legal rights 137 is also in a sense aimed at improving the function of an
existing legal regime by reducing information asymmetries between
the government and the people.
4. Improving Management or Firm Performance
Other disclosure regimes are intended to improve the performance
of managers, either by providing information that can be used to
monitor agents, 138 by creating information that managers would otherwise not have available to them, 139 or by forcing firms to confront
the facts by forcing them to gather data. Management theory suggests that managers “manage what [they] measure”; 140 that is, managers will pay attention to things they are forced to keep track of. 141
Confidential internal reporting of hospital medical mistakes can provide “a knowledge base for hospital managers to use in carrying out
safety improvements.” 142 Information can also lead to improved cooperation between firms. 143 The disclosure obligations that accompany
the patent process fall into this category; they make information publicly available that other parties can use to advance their own research and thereby facilitate a kind of involuntary interfirm coopera134. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 283-86.
135. An example of this is the Animal Welfare Act § 10, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2140 (2000), which
requires laboratories to retain records for government inspection. See Sunstein, supra note
8, at 622.
136. See e.g., Sage, supra note 7, at 1799.
137. See id. at 1765-66.
138. See Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1956 (2001).
139. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 297-300 (describing how information might improve management); see also Charlotte Villiers, Disclosure Obligations in Company Law:
Bringing Communication Theory into the Fold, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 181, 199-200 (2001)
(describing need for information within organizations). Theoretically, information that is
valuable to management will be produced, since there can be no market failure within the
firm, but agency problems might result in underproduction of internal information.
Moreover, a disclosure requirement that provides information about other firms can improve management by providing benchmarks for improvement. See Karkkainen, supra
note 11, at 261.
140. Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 295, 297-300; Louis Loewenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1335, 1342-45 (1996); Sage, supra note 7, at 1778 n.285; Williams, supra note 36, at 129496; Troy Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 465 (2003).
141. The SEC may have had this phenomenon in mind when it suggested that requiring analysts to certify their recommendations will cause them to use more care in making
those recommendations. See Regulation Analyst Certification, supra note 86, at ¶87,247.
142. GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 1.
143. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1771-78.
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tion. 144 A rather odd example of a disclosure obligation intended to
improve management is the recent change in SEC rules requiring
disclosure of correspondence between a company and a director who
resigned as the result of a dispute. 145 According to then-Chairman
Harvey Pitt, knowing that disclosure will be required will give directors “more leverage to raise their issues and concerns, and to be more
effective in doing so,” 146 presumably leading to more effective board
decision-making.
5. Increasing Public Awareness
In all these cases, the regulator generally assumes that there is a
need for, or at least an interest in, the information to be disclosed. In
some cases, however, the disclosure requirement may be an attempt
to generate interest in the information itself. 147 The SEC’s continuing
attempts to improve the disclosure of executive compensation 148 may
reflect its hope that eventually investors will start paying attention to the matter. The “Made in the USA” garment label and the
earlier “ILGWU” 149 label probably were intended, at least in part,
to raise consumers’ awareness of the conditions under which products are produced.
6. Unidentified Purposes
A few disclosure schemes, such as drinking water quality reports,
are enacted with no obvious goal. 150 Such schemes are usually said to
144. See also Sharon Begley, In Switch, Scientists Share Data to Develop Useful Drug
Therapies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2006, at A9 (describing disclosure requirement imposed by
foundations supporting medical research, which is intended to result in earlier cooperation
between researchers and clinicians).
145. See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing
Date, Securities Act Release No. 8400, Exchange Act Release No. 49424, [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,158, at 89,508 (Mar. 16, 2004).
146. Phyllis Plitch, Full Disclosure: New SEC Rules Reveal the Corporate Underbelly,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2005, at B4B.
147. This effect can be unintended. The disclosure of phenylketonurics (the presence of
NutraSweet) on food labels has generated both curiosity and concern. A Google search
for “phenylketonurics” turned up a number of panicked postings to bulletin boards
asking why the government would require that it be disclosed if it wasn’t dangerous.
According to one response, phenylketonurics disclosure is directed at those with a disorder making consumption of phenylalanine dangerous. See Ask the Doc,
http://www.wwu.edu/chw/ask_the_doc/post/1-1000/0537.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007);
see also Kevin Helliker, To Warn or Not to Warn, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2005, at R7 (describing consumers’ reaction (avoiding string beans) to a warning against consumption of fava
beans by children, which causes illness in rare cases).
148. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
149. International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union. Mature readers may remember
“look for the union label” television advertisements.
150. See, e.g., MODEL COURT RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE, supra note 3. The purpose of the Model Rule, which requires that attorneys disclose their malpractice coverage,
is “to provide a potential client with access to relevant information related to a lawyer’s re-
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provide important information, but the utility of the information may
not be clear. The sex offender registration acts 151 are an interesting
example. Their stated purpose is to protect the public by informing
citizens about the presence of sex offenders. 152 The citizens are then
expected to take whatever precautions they deem appropriate, presumably including keeping their children indoors but presumably not
including killing the sex offender. 153 Perhaps the purpose of the laws
is actually to cause so much harassment that the sex offender leaves
town. 154 Or registration may result in the offender’s choosing to settle
in another state after release from prison.155 There is some evidence
that this was in fact the intended purpose of the statutes and that
they in fact operate as intended to some degree. 156
B. Impediments to Information-Based Regulation
Even where the purposes of a disclosure requirement are relatively clear, however, the mechanism by which the disclosure is expected to accomplish its goal is rarely explained. Moreover, an examination of the mechanism by which a disclosure scheme operates
often reveals ambiguities in the purpose of the scheme as well. However, before we can consider how the disclosure of information can
accomplish a regulatory goal, it is helpful to understand three funpresentation in order to make an informed decision about whether to hire a particular lawyer.” Id. However, three states have required that attorneys report their coverage to the
bar but have not made that information available to the public. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL COURT RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/malprac_disc_chart.pdf.
151. Every state currently has some version of a sex offender registration act, which
generally requires a person convicted of specified sex offenses to register with law enforcement officials where the offender lives following release from incarceration. Smith
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89-90 (2003). There is also a Federal counterpart, 42 U.S.C. § 14071
(2000). Some of the relevant information is made available to the public. Smith, 538 U.S.
at 91.
152. Smith, 538 U.S. at 99, 101.
153. Id. at 101, 105 (noting that the sex offender registration web site included a warning that using the information contained therein to commit a crime against any person was
subject to criminal prosecution); see also Editorial, Knowledge Protects: Online Sex Offender Registries Are Vital, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, April 28, 2006, at 22A (noting that it
is not clear how the registries have protected anyone but arguing that publication of offender information is “vital”).
154. Cf. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100-01 (describing alleged harassment of a registered
sex offender).
155. This, however, merely transfers the risk to other people, especially if the sex offender, having learned a lesson, fails to re-register after a move. Cf. Scott v. Shepard,
(1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 525, 525-26 (K.B.) (describing the throwing of a “lighted squib” into a
marketplace and the subsequent repeated throwing of the squib to avoid injury to self).
Eventually, however, every state will have similar registration requirements and the statutes will no longer be able to accomplish this goal.
156. See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control,
and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1854-57 (2005). If this is true,
then the laws may be said to act in a kind of interstate market for desirable residents.
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damental limitations on any information-based system. The first is
the ability of individuals to process information, the second is the
way information affects individuals’ behavior, and the third is the
way information affects firms’ behavior.
In the past few decades, scholars in several disciplines have developed a more nuanced understanding of the way individuals react
to information. They have identified a number of predictable cognitive biases created by our limited ability to process information. 157
While a complete discussion of this literature is beyond the scope of
this Article, some heuristic biases are particularly relevant to the operation of disclosure systems. The availability bias, for example,
leads people to respond to information based on the “ease with which
instances or associations could be brought to mind.” 158 Thus, people
will overestimate the risk of an accident after seeing or hearing
about such an accident. 159 While disclosure requirements can present
novel and therefore theoretically more “available” information, that
information may not in fact be used unless it is also brought to the
direct attention of the decision-maker.
The “anchoring” bias results in a failure to adjust fully to new information. 160 Anchoring can be made worse by self-serving biases,
which prevent people from accepting or adjusting to information that
adversely affects their personal interests or contradicts their preexisting beliefs. 161 Moreover, people tend to be more easily persuaded
by oral communications or communications that engage the emotions
than by written or abstract information. 162 These biases are reflected
in the fact that people often accept information from unreliable
sources 163 and that anecdotes are often far more influential than sta157. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
158. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 157, at 163, 163-64; see also Prentice, supra note 97, at 1469-70 (noting that
“while making decisions, people tend to concentrate on facts that are ‘available’ in
their memories”); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL L AW AND ECONOMICS
1, 3-5 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (describing various kinds of biases, including the
availability bias).
159. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 158, at 178.
160. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 157,
at 3, 14-18; see also Bainbridge, supra note 120, at 1043-49 (discussing status quo bias and
endowment effect); Prentice, supra note 97, at 1483 (stating that people often do not sufficiently adjust to new information).
161. See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 157, at 179, 17982; Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 119, at 164-67 (noting the significant roledependent differences in assessment of “fair” settlement of tort case).
162. See Prentice, supra note 97, at 1467-69.
163. See Langevoort, supra note 83, at 156-63 (discussing trading behavior in response
to Internet chatter).
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tistics in decision-making. 164 Finally, decision-makers often engage in
“herd behavior,” which occurs when they behave in accordance with
what they perceive to be the behavior of others rather than engaging
in independent decision-making. 165
Another well-studied limit on the ability of information to affect
behavior is the “information overload” phenomenon. 166 This phenomenon occurs when an excess of information causes a decisionmaker to reject or ignore useful information and instead make an illinformed decision. 167 An increase in the usefulness of information
leads to better decisions, but more information in general leads to
higher costs of processing the information by the decision-maker. So,
increasing the amount of useful information available can actually
result in an individual’s making worse decisions as the costs of processing new information become too great. 168 Moreover, as information
quality improves, people tend to use more of the information available. Research indicates that as decision-makers increase the
amount of information they use, their decisions at first improve but
then tend to get worse. 169 Thus, an increase in the quality but not the
quantity of information available can also lead to information overload, as decision-makers are enticed, by its quality, to try to use more
of the available information. 170
Studies have also shown that decision-makers who have useless or
irrelevant information may make worse decisions than those with no
information at all, 171 and when there is much information available,
people appear to make better decisions when they use some but not
all the available information about the relevant attributes of the subject of the decision. 172 Because the format of information can cause or
164. See Richard E. Nisbett et al., Popular Induction: Information Is Not Necessarily
Informative, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 113, 128-31 (John S. Carroll & John W.
Payne eds., 1976).
165. See Bainbridge, supra note 120, at 1038; Langevoort, supra note 83, at 156-63.
166. See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 90-91; Kevin Lane Keller & Richard
Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, 14 J.
CONSUMER RES. 200, 200-01 (1987) (including a review of the literature).
167. See Paredes, supra note 140, at 440-43.
168. See id. at 202; see also Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 119, at 156 (arguing
that people with more information are more concerned with fairness, which will impact
operation of the market). But see Lublin & Scannell, supra note 85 (quoting SEC Chairman Cox: “It’s an odd approach to suggest we’ll make better decisions with poorer information . . . . I know of no market that works that way.”)
169. See Keller & Staelin, supra note 166, at 210-11.
170. See id.; see also MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 102-04 (describing study
showing that increasing less-important information [how to use a product] resulted in individuals’ remembering less detail about some things [what precautions to take] and instead remembering only more general information [what harm the product can cause]).
171. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 160, at 5; Colin Camerer et al., The Curse of
Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1232, 124446 (1989).
172. See Keller & Staelin, supra note 166, at 210-11.
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eliminate information overload, 173 it is an important consideration in
the design of a disclosure system. The problem of information overload can also be addressed by the operation of intermediaries, who
are trained to process and sift relevant information, provided that
those intermediaries do not suffer from their own biases and cognitive limitations. 174 Information that is not standardized and information that is not designed for easy comparisons will be less useful to a
decision-maker. 175 In addition, the ability to interpret information
may depend on the sophistication of the decision-maker.176
Once the targets of a disclosure system have processed the new information, they must decide whether and how to change their behavior based on that information. The amount and nature of information
that is likely to influence consumer behavior has been the subject of
considerable study. 177 For example, researchers have found that the
amount of information a consumer will seek in purchasing big-ticket
durables is significantly influenced by the nature of the earliest information the consumer receives. 178 Consumers who initially used information from friends and family or the store where they purchased
the product were less likely to seek other information than consumers who used books and shopping guides. 179 Perhaps surprisingly,
consumers with advanced degrees sought less information than others, 180 and the price of an item purchased did not affect the amount of

173. See W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 18-26 (1987).
174. See Paredes, supra note 140, at 452-59; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 157, at 414, 414-16.
175. See GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 13-18 (criticizing disclosure systems that fail to provide up-to-date, standardized, comparative, or otherwise easy-to-use information).
176. Where verifiable information is known to be available to one party in a transaction but not disclosed to the other party, the second party should view that as a signal that
the information is unfavorable to the first party. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 30-31 (1986). Not all individuals will make this inference, however. In a study of the market for salad dressings
prior to required nutrition labeling, the market share of the nondisclosing (and presumably
higher-fat) brands varied with the percentage of college-educated shoppers in the population. Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An
Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651, 665 (2000).
177. See, e.g., ROBERT LEVINE, THE POWER OF PERSUASION (2003).
178. See Richard Staelin & John W. Payne, Studies of the Information-Seeking Behavior of Consumers, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 164, at 185, 199-200.
179. Id. at 195-96; see also Ginger Zhe Jin, Consumer Information About Health Plan
Quality: Evidence Prior to the National Medicare Education Program 13-15 (Dec. 18, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.glue.umd.edu/~ginger/research/MedicareDec02.pdf. Professor Jin notes that although consumers say they want information on
health care providers, it is not clear that they use it. See id. at 3. Rather, they generally
use “self experiences, experience of trusted friends and family members, and doctor recommendations” more frequently than formally available information. Id.
180. See Staelin & Payne, supra note 178, at 201.
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information sought prior to purchase. 181 Other studies show that consumers respond more readily to a specific warning about a single
hazard than to a general warning. 182 Furthermore, only new information, not repeated exhortations about old information (such as warnings about tobacco and seat belts), will affect behavior. 183
It is also harder to get people to change behavior than it is to influence a single decision that they are going to make anyway. 184
Similarly, influencing consumers to make a one-time change in behavior, such as the purchase of a smoke detector, is easier than causing them to change patterns of behavior over time. 185 Even if individuals’ attitudes change, they may not change their behavior. 186
Some studies have concluded that information does not change behavior at all, that consumers are not interested in safety information,
and that providing more information can be counterproductive by
leading people to become more set in their ways. 187
Another consideration involved in whether someone will change
her behavior in response to information is whether the information is
salient. 188 “[C]oncrete, emotionally interesting information” is more
likely to influence behavior than abstract information because such
information is more likely to call up “ ‘scripts’ . . . or schemas involving similar information.” 189 Announcing that a product causes cancer
is much more likely to change consumer behavior than publishing
the fact that it exceeds the federal recommended daily allowance of
fat, although the latter probably poses a much larger health risk.190
Finally, a disclosure scheme that involves the action of firms, as
most do, will depend on the complex and poorly understood mecha181. See id. at 200-01.
182. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Informational Regulation of Consumer Health Risks: An
Empirical Evaluation of Hazard Warnings, 17 RAND J. ECON. 351, 361-62 (1986).
183. See VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 173, at 124. This may explain the phenomenon
noted by fitness guru Richard Simmons: “ ‘There’ll always be some weird thing about eating four grapes before you go to bed, or drinking a special tea, or buying this little bean
from El Salvador . . . . If you watch your portions and you have a good attitude and you
work out every day you’ll live longer, feel better and look terrific.” Awaiting the Next Hot
Diet Fad, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2005, at D4.
184. See Adler & Pittle, supra note 8, at 163.
185. Id. at 191.
186. Id. at 168-69.
187. See id. at 166-68. Alternatively, people may overreact. See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 163.
188. See VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 173, at 17 (noting that people “ignore information that they feel has little benefit”).
189. Nisbett et al., supra note 164, at 128. This phenomenon illustrates the operation
of the availability bias.
190. See generally MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 174-75 (discussing inappropriate public fears); Kevin Helliker, supra note 147. For examples of the public’s inaccurate
assessment of risks, see Cass Sunstein, Commentary, Fear Factor: Truth Is, Sunbathing Is
Probably More Dangerous than Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at B11; see also
MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 12, 64.
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nism by which firms act. 191 As economists often note, firms are particularly susceptible to agency problems as a result of the differing
incentives of different actors. 192 Various theories attempt to provide
an account of the way in which a firm will react to external stimuli
such as regulation or new information. 193 The structure of the firm
will in large part determine the behavior of managers, 194 and that
structure may lead an individual to engage in behavior that does not
advance the goals of the firm as a whole, but only the goals of her
unit. 195 In addition, information may be lost between levels of the hierarchy. 196 Systems theory suggests that firms function at an equilibrium which they try to maintain in response to external forces. 197 According to this theory, a firm will “act” independently of the motivations of its employees. 198 The view of the firm as a culture posits that
each firm has a set of behaviors and attitudes that are its own, independent of the individuals in the firm. 199 The individuals within the
firm will behave in accordance with the culture, and their behavior
will in turn determine the actions taken by the firm. 200
Regulatory mechanisms, including disclosure, must take into account the fact that the structure of a firm and the behavior of individuals within a firm ultimately determine the behavior of the firm
itself. Individuals in the firm will be subject to all the biases and
cognitive quirks described above, but the structure of the firm itself
influences decision-making. Senior managers may have an incentive
to enhance the profitability of the firm 201 because they have invested
considerable personal capital in the firm and because their compensation may be tied to the firm’s financial performance. Therefore,
theoretically they have an incentive to respond to economic stimuli
such as consumer preferences. In a large and complex organization,
however, detailed information about consumer preferences may not
be available to senior managers. Employees with access to consumer
information may not have the same incentives or employment goals
as employees responsible for designing the firm’s products or deter191. See Edward L. Rubin, Images of Organizations and Consequences of Regulation, 6
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 347, 348 (2005).
192. See, e.g., id. at 351 (discussing the agency problems “rampant” in firms); Michael
J. Meurer, Law, Economics and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 733-36
(2004) (discussing agency costs and the theory of the firm generally).
193. See generally Meurer, supra note 192 (describing various models of economic organization); Rubin, supra note 191 (same).
194. See Rubin, supra note 191, at 353.
195. See id. at 356.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 358.
198. See id. at 360.
199. See id. at 362-63.
200. See id. at 364; see also Krawiec, supra note 19, at 599-601.
201. Alternatively, they may have an incentive only to enhance their own wealth.
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mining its labor or hazardous waste disposal policies.202
Disclosure policies that depend on firms’ responses to market activity must consider whether the internal structure of firms makes it
likely that such responses will occur. For example, information that
affects the capital markets and the reputation of the firm may be
more likely to result in changes in firm behavior than information
that affects a product market because those effects are more likely to
come to the attention of senior management. 203
C. Mechanisms of Operation
Given what we know about how people process information and
how information can affect behavior, how can a disclosure system accomplish a regulatory goal? Most disclosure systems operate through
markets, in the broadest sense of the word. 204 Providing information
to decision-makers is expected to cause them to choose the better
product. If enough people make that choice, bad products will be
forced out of the market altogether or producers will raise the quality
of their own products. So, for example, restaurant hygiene improved
in Los Angeles after enactment of an ordinance that required hygiene
scores to be posted, 205 and the output of toxic waste declined after the
institution of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), which required
firms to disclose the amount of certain named pollutants they produced. 206 There are other mechanisms also, however, such as reputational effects and simple persuasion by which disclosure can operate.
A disclosure system’s purpose, as well as its context, will determine
the mechanisms by which it can operate.

202. Cf. Joseph P. White & Stephen Power, VW Chief Confronts Corporate Culture,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2005, at B2 (quoting Volkswagen AG’s chief executive’s complaints
that “managers and engineers . . . paid too much attention to technology and features” and
not enough to customers and that “[m]anagers considered their operations successful because they booked profits on sales to other VW business units”).
203. See RONALD J. ALSOP, THE 18 IMMUTABLE LAWS OF CORPORATE REPUTATION:
CREATING, PROTECTING, AND REPAIRING YOUR MOST VALUABLE ASSET 36-51 (2004) (stating
that a corporation’s reputation depends on how well it balances the demands of its various
stakeholder groups).
204. See, e.g., Parkinson, supra note 14, at 11-19 (describing operation of product, labor, and financial markets); cf. Sage, supra note 7, at 1781 (citing operation of “competitive
forces, grassroots activism, and reputational concerns” in disclosure schemes). A few information schemes—such as the food pyramid, tobacco warning labels, and advertising to
discourage drunk driving and encourage seatbelt use—operate solely by persuasion. Programs which are intended to persuade people to abandon risky behaviors can be distinguished from those that seek only to inform people of risks and allow them to make their
own judgments—such as nutrition and pesticide labeling and warnings about drug side effects. See GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 7.
205. See Jin & Leslie, supra note 132, at 410-11, 449-50.
206. See infra note 244.
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1. The Role of a Market
To the extent that a disclosure system is intended only to enhance
an existing market by correcting an informational asymmetry, it
achieves its purpose if the necessary information reaches the appropriate audience in a usable form. What the buyers do with the information is irrelevant. However, the disclosure will be useless unless
the disclosed information is actually interesting and useful to the decision-makers in the market. As noted above, for example, one can
criticize securities disclosure rules for requiring the disclosure of information that would not be material to most investors. Also, as discussed in Part IV.C.3, below, the information must be provided in a
format that enables it to be understood by the relevant decisionmaker or, alternatively, be provided to intermediaries who will digest
the information. Although these are not simple requirements, the use
of a disclosure requirement to correct an information asymmetry in
an existing market involves a relatively straightforward mechanism.
More commonly, however, regulatory disclosure schemes are intended to produce a particular result in a market. 207 Food labeling
requirements about trans fatty acids presumably are intended not
merely to inform consumers but also to encourage them to purchase
healthier foods. If those consumers do so, manufacturers will adjust
their formulations and produce healthier foods, or at least healthier
alternatives. If for some reason consumers used the new information
to increase their fat intake, 208 the system would have improved the
function of the market but not achieved its public health goal. If consumers ignore the information completely, the system will have
achieved nothing. Thus, the success of the nutrition labeling requirements depends upon the way in which the new information affects the market, which in turn depends on whether and how the information is used by consumers.
This market effect depends upon the existence of a number of
conditions. First, the consumers must care about the information
enough for it to change their decisions. A consumer’s choice of a
health care provider, for example, may not be sensitive to price. 209
Second, they must have a decision to make. Information cannot alter
consumers’ behavior if the purchasing decision is out of their hands
(as may be the case in the choice of health care plans or providers) 210
207. As part of its effort to improve the treatment of animals, the European Union is
proposing to approve a label on food indicating that it was produced using “humane” methods. This will, it is hoped, encourage consumers to purchase such foods. Mary Jacoby, EU
Arm Backs ‘Humane’ Farming Label, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2006, at A19.
208. The temporary popularity of the high-fat Atkins diet makes this hypothetical not
as absurd as it may seem.
209. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1725.
210. See id. at 1720-21.
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or if there are no sufficiently similar competing products (which may
be the case with hospitals or airlines). 211 Third, the producer must be
able to adjust its behavior in response to market pressures. 212 Existing technology might not make it possible, for example, for a manufacturer to avoid using a toxic substance. 213 Finally, all the actors in
the regulatory drama—consumers, producers, and intermediaries—
must be acting at least somewhat rationally.
Consider OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard (HCS), 214
which requires chemical producers and employers to provide information about the risks of toxic substances to the users of the chemicals, including workers who are exposed to the chemicals in downstream workplaces. 215 The premise of HCS is that participants in the
labor market cannot demand the appropriate risk premium for exposure to toxic substances unless they have information about toxicity
in general and specific workplace exposure. 216 Once workers are fully
informed, wages and benefits will fully address the toxicity risk,
manufacturers and employers will take “efficient care,” and toxic exposure will be reduced. 217 If the labor market is not efficient for reasons other than information asymmetries218 or if other factors besides
safety dominate decisions by workers, HCS cannot achieve its goal of
improving workplace safety.
2. Nonmarket Mechanisms
Where the market conditions described above do not exist, there
211. Cf. June Kronholz, A New Wealth of Details for Comparing Colleges, WALL ST. J.,
June 30, 2004, at D1 (noting difficulty of making comparisons between colleges and universities despite the vast amount of available information).
212. See Lucian Bebchuk, The SEC: Beyond Disclosure, F ORBES , Jan. 19, 2006,
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/columnists/2006/01/18/sec-executive-compcomment-cx_lb_0119bebchuk.html (arguing that executive compensation disclosure will
not reduce excessive compensation if the market for executives is not functioning).
213. Economists tell us that market pressures will eventually lead to the necessary
technological developments, but there may be a substantial delay before that can be
accomplished.
214. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2006).
215. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 106 (1995).
216. See Leslie I. Boden & Carol Adaire Jones, Occupational Disease Remedies: The
Asbestos Experience, in PUBLIC REGULATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS AND
POLICIES 321, 325-26 (Elizabeth E. Bailey ed., 1987); see also Thomas A. Lambert, Avoiding Regulatory Mismatch in the Workplace: An Informational Approach to Workplace
Safety Regulation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1006, 1015-32 (2004) (identifying the problem of workplace safety as an informational asymmetry).
217. See Boden & Jones, supra note 216, at 327-28; Lambert, supra note 216, at 1021
n.69, 1038 n.118. But see MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 5-8, 168 (discussing inappropriate reactions to information about risk).
218. For a discussion of some of the limitations on bargaining in labor markets, see
Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 229-31, 24045 (2001).
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are other mechanisms by which information may affect behavior. The
most powerful of these is through its effect on reputation. As one
commentator has written, “[h]ad commentator Armstrong Williams
been forced to disclose that the Education Department was going to
pay him $240,000 to promote the No Child Left Behind Act, he might
not have taken the money.” 219 Programs such as “Johns TV,” which
post the names and faces of those arrested or convicted of solicitation
of prostitution on local-access television or the Internet, have been
remarkably successful. 220 It has been proposed that colleges be required to disclose racial and economic data for “legacy” and earlydecision admissions, in the hope that schools will voluntarily limit
such preferences once their effects are known. 221 Reputational effects
can be especially important to firms, which must rely on goodwill
among customers, employees, and the government. 222 Anyone using
information to affect a firm’s reputation must take into account
the fact that customers, investors, employees, juries, and regulators will often make decisions about firms based on prior, background understandings rather than rational analysis. 223 In order
for information to have a reputational effect, however, the target
must be concerned about its reputation and the public must care
about the information disclosed. 224
Alternatively, a disclosure scheme can cause the desired result
when concerned groups use the information in the political sphere. 225
Information may be politically exploited in a number of ways, including lobbying for direct legislation or regulation and conducting boycotts and other collective action. 226 An example of this type of disclosure scheme was created by NEPA, 227 which requires governmental
219. David Wessel, Conflict-of-Interest Disclosures May Not Protect the Unsophisticated,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at A2; see also Sage, supra note 7, at 1769-70 (arguing that disclosure of unprofessional behavior would discourage that behavior among professionals).
220. See Eva-Marie Ayala, Dallas Police Web Site Posts Photos of Arrested Johns, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 8, 2004, at B5.
221. See Daniel Golden, Bill Would Make Colleges Report Legacies, Early Admissions,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2003, at B1.
222. See Ronald J. Alsop, Word of Mouth Is Cheap, but Valuable, Survey Finds, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 6, 2005 (discussing importance of reputation generally); Alsop, supra note 203,
at 36-51 (same); Karkkainen supra note 11, at 327-28 (same); Graham, supra note 7, at 8
(discussing importance of reputation to employees); Parkinson, supra note 14, at 14 (discussing importance of reputation in dealing with governments).
223. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text (discussing examples of cognitive biases).
224. It is interesting to contemplate whether “Sewer Bill Scofflaw TV” would be likely
to decrease delinquency rates. See Russ Pulley, Tattletale Television, KANSAS CITY STAR,
July 10, 2005, at B1 (describing suggestion that city post on local-access television the
names of residents who were delinquent on their sewer bills).
225. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 310, 315; Sage, supra note 7, at 1784; Sunstein,
supra note 8, at 619 (citing “eco-labels” as an example).
226. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 316-20 (discussing the regulation context).
227. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
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agencies to produce an environmental impact study for any project
having a major effect on the environment. The goal of the act is simply to compile and disclose the data; the agency does not have to consider it or give it weight. 228 However, members of the public receive
the information and can take political action on the matter if they
care. 229 Similarly, proposed disclosure requirements under the securities laws relating to corporations’ social activities often have as
their goal making information available to political activists, rather
than investors. 230 Community Reinvestment Act 231 disclosure, which
was effective in causing actual changes in lending practices, was
used by the Federal Reserve and the Comptroller of the Currency in
the merger approval process, by advocacy groups, and by the media. 232 In order for disclosure to operate through a political mechanism or collective action, of course, the disclosed information must be
of interest to a sufficiently large and committed group.
A number of recent information-based regulations operate by creating a cascade of fears resulting from the disclosure of highly salient
risk information to consumers. The interaction of consumers’ information-processing mechanisms and the content and design of the
disclosed information, together with the fact of disclosure itself, may
result in the consumers overreacting to disclosed risks. This mechanism was used by California’s Proposition 65, which requires that
relevant products contain a warning stating that the product contains a substance “known to the state [of California] to cause cancer.” 233 The alleged purpose of the warning is to inform consumers
about risks, but the warning provides no information about the actual risk, 234 which may be poorly understood even by experts.235 How228. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 621.
229. See id. at 622.
230. See Villiers, supra note 139, at 194-95, 202-03, 209-08; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary: Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Materiality, 48 CATH. U. L. REV.
93, 95-96 (1998) (“If we are coming to see investors as simply one kind of corporate stakeholder, why not provide disclosure for the benefit of other stakeholders (including public
interests)?”).
231. 12 U.S.C.A. §§2901-2907 (2006) (establishing regulatory scrutiny of lending practices). Disclosure is made pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C.A.
§2801 et seq. (2006).
232. See Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies Sustainable? 20-22 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov., Harvard Univ., Faculty
Research
Working
Paper
No.
RWP03-039,
Oct.
2003),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=384922.
233. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
25249.6 (West 1999); see also MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 165. Congress is currently considering a bill that would preempt state food-labeling laws that are inconsistent
with FDA regulations. See National Uniformity for Food Act of 2005, H.R. 4167, 109th
Cong. (2005).
234. See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 166; see also Kevin Helliker, supra note
147 (reporting doctor’s position against warning about all dangers because some risks are
very small and warnings may cause misunderstandings).
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ever, the requirement reportedly resulted in manufacturers reformulating their products to avoid the labeling requirement, 236 thus, perhaps, achieving the regulatory goal. 237
Similarly, the new requirement that food labels disclose the presence of common allergens in any amount, including trace amounts
caused by cross-contamination, 238 has resulted in several manufacturers reformulating their products. 239 The FDA has not required, or
even issued guidance about, disclosing the amount of the allergen
present or its likelihood of producing a reaction, in part because people react differently to allergens. 240 The labeling requirement may
therefore cause those with mild allergies to avoid foods that are perfectly safe because they do not have the information needed to assess
their risk. More likely, manufacturers will reformulate their products
to remove trace amounts of allergens that would have made the food
hazardous to a relatively small number of people.
3. The Usefulness of Information
Whether the information is directed at a market, at reputations,
or at community groups, it must be disclosed in a usable way. 241 The
format of information is extremely important in determining its use-

235. See Peter Waldman, Toxic Traces: New Questions About Old Chemicals, WALL ST.
J., July 25, 2005, at A1 (describing new research casting doubt on much that is currently
believed about chemical toxicity).
236. See Randolph B. Smith, California Spurs Reformulated Products, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1, 1990, at B1, cited in Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 345 n.364.
237. Banning the products would have required a cost-benefit analysis of a product
ban. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 163, 184-85, 193 (describing issues and analysis surrounding proposed ban on saccharin and the disutility of using warnings instead); supra
note 11 and accompanying text. The disclosure system accomplished the same result using
essentially uninformed decision-making by consumers untrained in either toxicology or risk
assessment. Cf. BREYER, supra note 10, at 162 (describing eight-year process of developing a
tire rating system by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration).
238. See Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108282, Part II, codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 343 (2000).
239. See Jane Zhang, How Much Soy Lecithin Is in That Cookie?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13,
2005, at D1; CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
APPROACHES TO ESTABLISH THRESHOLDS FOR MAJOR FOOD ALLERGENS AND GLUTEN IN
FOOD 45-48 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~acrobat/alrgn2.pdf (describing factors to consider in setting thresholds); id. at 47-48 (describing problem of serious reactions to very low doses of allergens).
240. See Zhang, supra note 239, at D1.
241. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 163-64; cf. Schwarcz, supra note 90, at 8-9 (discussing SEC initiatives to make disclosure more understandable); Note, The Elephant in the
Room: Evolution, Behavioralism, and Counteradvertising in the Coming War Against Obesity, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1182 (2003) (discussing FDA’s failed efforts to ensure a useful
format for nutrition labels); Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Doctor’s Orders Are
Useless if They’re Befuddling, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2003, at D2 (discussing ways to improve patients’ understanding).

2007]

USE AND MISUSE OF DISCLOSURE

1125

fulness. 242 For comparisons, for example, the information must be in
the same format for both items and placed where the decision-maker
will see it at the time of decision. 243 Information about single facts is
more useful than a wide range of information, 244 and in some circumstances rating systems are more useful than raw data. 245 Even presentation, typeface, and design can make a significant difference in
the usefulness of information. 246
In addition, intermediaries can serve to increase the usefulness of
information in other areas as they do in securities markets. For one
thing, if there are a sufficient number of informed buyers, the market
itself can act as an intermediary for the uninformed and unsophisticated, 247 just as the securities market does. Alternatively, intermediaries, such as the media and special interest groups, can act to interpret disclosed information or digest it into a small number of usable
signals in the same way that financial information is theoretically
built into the price of a security by the action of the market. Intermediaries, especially the media, can also serve to increase the salience of disclosed information. There is a danger, of course, that the
interpretation of information by intermediaries may be biased.
Therefore, a disclosure system that relies on intermediaries should
consider how those intermediaries themselves will operate, and the
information disclosed should be designed for use by the intermediaries. 248 In some contexts, such as the “Energy Star” ratings on home
appliances, intermediaries are not necessary. On the other hand, disclosure of more complex information into a market where there are
no intermediaries is unlikely to produce the desired effect.
Format, design, and the presence of intermediaries are particularly important considerations when the disclosed information is
complex or where additional knowledge is required to understand the
information. OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard can be effective only to the extent workers are capable of understanding the
242. See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 133-56, 159-60; Viscusi et al., supra note
182, at 356-61 (discussing results of tests of varying warning labels on bleach and drain
cleaners). Recent FDA drug labeling rules focus solely on format. See Anna Wilde
Mathews, FDA Issues New Rules for Drug Labels, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2006, at D1.
243. For example, comparative information should be placed separately at the point of
sale, not on the package. See VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 173, at 18-19, 26, 29, 33-38; see
also Lambert, supra note 216, at 1042-44 (arguing that consumers need informational intermediaries when data is not presented in a comparative format).
244. See J. Edward Russo et al., Nutrition Information in the Supermarket, 13 J.
CONSUMER RES. 48, 62, 64-65 (1986).
245. See id. at 59, 67; Jin, supra note 179, at 13, 15.
246. See Viscusi et al., supra note 182, at 356-61.
247. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary
Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45,
50 (2003); Lambert, supra note 216, at 1024 n.77, 1038 n.117, 1061-62.
248. See, e.g., Mathews, supra note 242 (describing FDA drug-labeling rules aimed
at physicians).
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risks of the substances described and of pricing those risks. 249 The
fact that disclosure systems are often used where substantive regulation
is difficult may increase the likelihood that they will require the disclosure of information whose relevance is poorly understood.250
4. Examples
The complicated mechanisms by which disclosure systems operate
is illustrated by the TRI, which was successful in reducing toxic releases. 251 Because the information was so widely used by political
groups, by the media, and by investors, it is difficult to say what
caused firms to adjust their behavior. Among the possibilities are the
fear of substantive regulation, 252 the desire to preserve corporate
goodwill with consumers and workers, 253 the desire to preserve the
personal reputation of managers, the sudden realization by managers that they were polluting, 254 concern for the firm’s stock price in
view of investor reaction either to the pollution itself or to the potential regulatory response to the fact of pollution, 255 or, most likely, a
combination of these factors. 256
Campaign finance disclosure, which requires reporting of the
sources and amounts of contributions and expenditures, 257 tends to
operate through intermediaries such as interest groups, political parties, and the media, who have an interest in compiling that information and drawing it to the attention of voters. 258 Moreover, the information itself operates as a signal about additional, undisclosed information. The identity of a candidate’s or proposition’s supporters
can help voters decide how to vote, especially if the supporters have

249. See supra note 218; see also Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 325 (noting that information disclosed under the Hazard Communication Standard is not standardized or presented in useful form).
250. See GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 18-19 (arguing that nutrition and other risk information is—and should be—of limited utility because no one really understands the targeted risks); cf. Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 291 (noting, as a benefit of the TRI, that it
does not require the EPA to determine the risk of a substance).
251. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 287-88. For an excellent discussion of the relevant mechanisms by which the TRI operated, see id. at 294-331.
252. See id. at 311.
253. See id. at 323-28.
254. See id. at 261, 295-300 (arguing that the standardized and easily analyzed TRI
data enabled managers to address toxic releases and provided benchmarks by which they
could measure their progress).
255. See id. at 323-24.
256. See id. at 328-29.
257. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2002).
258. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 125, at 297-98 (noting the role of political parties
and interest groups in simplifying voter choice). But see Elizabeth Garrett, The William J.
Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law: The Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in
the Courts and in Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 665, 690-91 (2002) (noting that intermediaries tend to provide incomplete and one-sided information).
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well-known ideological or political positions. 259 Similarly, if the goal
of campaign finance disclosure is discouraging corruption, rather
than or in addition to informing voters, 260 then the information is
likely to be used by opposing parties and the media to draw attention
to patterns of donations and behavior. That attention in turn operates through a reputational effect.
The disclosure of labor practices can provide ammunition for various groups in the political process. It is also expected to lead to consumers’ and investors’ refusing to deal with companies with unacceptable labor practices. 261 This expectation is based on a number of
perhaps unfounded assumptions: first, that consumers and investors
care enough about labor practices to act on that interest when making purchasing decisions; 262 second, that consumers and investors
understand the implications of the information they receive; 263 and
third, that firms will respond to the behavior of consumers and investors by improving labor practices. 264 The design of the disclosure
system can take these variables into consideration once the mechanism of the system’s operation is understood. 265
D. Disadvantages to the Use of Disclosure as Regulation
Even if a regulator has an identifiable goal that is likely to be met
by the disclosure of information, there are additional considerations
it must take into account. Disclosure has costs, including costs to
create, compile, and publish the relevant information, 266 and the
costs of any particular disclosure scheme may outweigh its benefits. 267 Disclosure schemes, like all regulation, can also have unin-

259. See Garrett, supra note 258, at 678-80.
260. See Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237,
238-42 (2004). Professor Garrett describes the Justices’ evaluation of the purposes of campaign finance disclosure and its method of operation, including the importance of intermediaries and the use of heuristics, id. at 239-40, as well as its possible negative effects, id. at
241-43. She also notes the Court’s emphasis on disclosure of the true identities of contributors not only to deter corruption but also to ensure informed voting. Id. at 240-41.
261. See Doorey, supra note 127, at 357, 378, 390, 393, 394.
262. It is one thing to care about labor practices and another to refuse to purchase an
otherwise desirable product because of them. See Pat Auger & Timothy M. Devinney, Do
What Consumers Say Matter? The Misalignment of Preferences with Unconstrained Ethical
Intentions (Apr. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901861.
263. See Doorey, supra note 127, at 380-84 (noting that wages that seem outrageous to
American consumers may in fact be quite high and attractive for workers in foreign locations).
264. See id. at 386-88 (describing unintended consequences such as firms simply stopping production and thereby significantly worsening conditions for local workers).
265. See id. at 395-404 (evaluating several proposed disclosure schemes based on
these criteria).
266. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1721-22.
267. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 626.
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tended consequences. 268 If disclosure of more information is tied to
the disclosure of some, the scheme may discourage the disclosure of
any information at all. 269 The costs of complying with disclosure obligations may result in some actors withdrawing from the market. 270
In addition, required disclosure can lead disclosers to “game” the statistics. 271 Report cards on bypass surgery reportedly caused some
hospitals to reject sicker patients. 272 Law professors may be familiar
with the practice of some law schools to alter the statistics used in
the vilified U.S. News and World Report survey. 273
Intended consequences also have costs. California may have intended Proposition 65 to force producers to reformulate their products to exclude “cancer-causing” substances. That reformulation had
costs. Because the regulation used disclosure, however, the costbenefit analysis, if any, was unlikely to focus on those costs. Instead,
most regulators consider only the direct costs of producing the information. 274 In fact, no one considered whether the costs of reformulating a product outweighed the risk from the substances involved: the
consumer did not have the necessary information, and, because consumers generally avoided products bearing the warning label, the
producers had to weigh the costs of reformulation against the benefit
of continuing to sell their products at all.
In sum, although there are a variety of ways in which disclosure
systems can accomplish their goals, their effectiveness will be limited
by a number of factors that must be taken into account in the design
of the system. Moreover, only when one understands the mechanism
by which the disclosure system will operate can one assess the likelihood that it will in fact achieve its goal and what the true costs of the
disclosure requirement are. 275 Because disclosure systems are politi268. See David Wessel, Grading Surgeons May Be Healthy Practice, WALL ST. J., July
6, 2006, at A2 (noting that poorly rated surgeons may have moved to states that did not
have report cards); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget
Process 11 (Univ. of S. Cal. L. Sch., Legal Studies Working Paper Series No. 6, Jan. 23,
2006) (noting that transparency early in the budget process can allow special interest
groups to intervene in the legislative process).
269. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 628.
270. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1721-22.
271. See Hu, supra note 35, at 1317.
272. David Wessel, Eatery Report Cards: A Model for Schools?, WALL ST. J., May 29,
2003, at A2.
273. See Jeffrey E. Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations,
and Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229, 232-42 (2006); Alex
Wellen, The $8.78 Million Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, § 4A, at 18.
274. See Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542
(proposed Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 228-40, 245, 249, 274), available at
http://www.iasplus.com/usa/0601seccompensation.pdf (discussing variety of costs of
collection, preparation, and publication of information but not considering the costs of
any consequences).
275. Cf. MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 1-2 (noting the need for cost-benefit
analysis in adopting disclosure systems).
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cally palatable and relatively cheap, however, they are often adopted
without that understanding and assessment.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Commentators have suggested a number of factors determining
whether a disclosure system is likely to succeed. 276 For example, a
disclosure scheme is more likely to adapt and survive over time if
disclosers have a stake in its success; if the disclosers receive some
benefit from disclosure; and if the disclosure is aimed at organized,
committed user groups. 277 Disclosure systems are less likely to work
where disclosers are required to report negative information about
themselves and where the information must be newly created. 278 Disclosure obligations must also be enforced. 279 The enforcement
scheme, like the disclosure system itself, must be designed in accordance with the goals of the system and its method of operation.
A more complete analysis of a variety of disclosure schemes suggests additional criteria for success and considerations for adoption.
First, a regulator must identify a specific regulatory goal, preferably
a non-pretextual one, for the disclosure system. 280 Increasing the
amount of information available to the public is not an acceptable
regulatory goal in itself. 281 Rather, if the goal of a disclosure system
is to provide more information to consumers, investors, or the public,
the regulatory purpose must address why that information will be
useful to an underlying regulatory goal and why it is not currently
available. The fact that a disclosure scheme may appear less intrusive than traditional regulation should not excuse regulators from
stating their goal, not least because the goal of a disclosure system
will determine the mechanism by which it is likely to operate.282
Second, the regulator must identify one or more mechanisms
through which the disclosure system will operate and should show
that the operation of that mechanism is likely to achieve the regula276. See GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 29-30.
277. See Fung et al., supra note 232, at 38-40.
278. See id. at 34 (noting the potential budget impact and the negative effects on
reputation).
279. See, e.g., Sage, supra note 7, at 1821-23.
280. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 34-35. Traditionally, regulation was justified by the
inability of the market to deal with “structural” problems. Id. at 15. The first step of such
regulation is to identify the problem with the market. See id. at 15-34 (describing possible
problems requiring regulatory intervention).
281. One can imagine a Monty-Pythonesque department of information, charged by
Congress with ensuring that all sorts of useful and useless information are disseminated.
At present, however, there is no such agency (other than, some might argue, the SEC).
282. Cf. Lambert, supra note 216, at 1013-14, 1032-33 (arguing that the process of
adopting workplace safety regulations should be first, to identify the problem; second, to
identify the market failure responsible for the problem; and third, to identify the appropriate way to fix that market failure).
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tory goal. 283 If the regulator cannot identify such a mechanism, disclosure is not an appropriate method of regulation. 284 In addition, the
disclosure system must be designed with the operative mechanism in
mind. If the system is intended to operate through its effect on a decision-maker’s reputation, the information must be designed to reach
an audience the decision-maker cares about and it must contain
information the audience is likely to find interesting. If disclosure
is expected to operate through the political process, it must be directed at an issue likely to attract the attention of an organized
interest group.
If the disclosure system is intended to operate through a market
of some kind, that market must be further examined. The regulator
must show that additional information will be sufficiently salient and
in sufficiently usable form to reach and have an effect on the behavior of market participants, either directly or through the operation of
intermediaries. Whether market participants are likely to respond
rationally to the proposed information and whether they have the
power to change others’ behavior by their own market behavior must
also be considered. The content and format of the disclosed information should be designed to account for the target audience’s likely
heuristic biases and decision-making processes. The biases of any intermediaries must also be taken into consideration. The regulator
must also conclude that the market is sufficiently competitive that
decision-makers have meaningful choices and producers have an incentive to react to changes in demand. To the extent the behavior of
firms is part of the picture, the regulator must consider whether
firms are likely to respond to the market signal as hoped.
If the disclosure system is not expected to operate through any of
these mechanisms, the regulator must identify an alternative. Perhaps the disclosure requirement is intended to force firms to gather
information they would otherwise ignore and thereby improve managers’ performance. Perhaps the disclosure is intended to allow cooperation among firms by making information about innovations available both for further development and for challenge and testing.
Such disclosure schemes must be carefully designed to provide information in a form useful for those purposes.
Once the regulator has identified the mechanism by which a disclosure system is expected to operate, she must consider the costs of
the scheme. These will include not only the costs of creating, gathering, and disseminating the information but also the costs resulting
283. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 191-94 (describing appropriate steps to creating
disclosure requirements); see also Lambert, supra note 216, at 1067-69 (proposing structure for adoption of workplace safety disclosure requirements).
284. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 193.
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from disclosers or targets changing their behavior in response to the
scheme. 285 The costs of unintended consequences, which are likely to
be identified during a notice-and-comment process, must also be considered. As with all regulation, all those costs must be weighed
against the anticipated benefits before the scheme is adopted. In
short, adoption of a disclosure system should not be easy.
In sum, every disclosure scheme must have an articulated purpose, an identified mechanism through which it can accomplish that
purpose, a design that takes into account the operation of that
mechanism, and a careful analysis showing that the benefits of the
system outweigh its costs. Traditionally, securities disclosures have
met these criteria, although some specific disclosure requirements
may be of questionable utility. Moreover, securities disclosure operates in a very unusual context. Securities regulation can serve as a
model for other disclosure systems only if they are similarly crafted,
carefully considered, and designed to operate by identifiable and
plausible mechanisms.

285. See Rubin, supra note 191, at 390 (noting that firms can usually find a way to
avoid regulation if they want to badly enough).

